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Assurance networks are one of the essential technologies of New-generation Networks.
Assurance is deﬁned as the capability of guaranteeing functional and non-functional system
properties such as dependability, security, timeliness and adaptability to heterogeneous
and changing requirements. Assurance is essential for sustainable networks and this
research focused speciﬁcally on providing assurance for WSNs. Node capture attacks are
one prospective kind of attack on WSNs. To reduce negative effect of node capture attacks,
we have previously proposed secure decentralized data transfer. In this proposed method,
it was assumed that multiple paths were in place. In this paper as well, we again
propose using the multipath routing method. To make multiple paths ﬁt our previously
proposed method, we have modiﬁed ATR (Augmented Tree Based Routing). We have
conducted simulation experiments using our proposed method in a network simulator. The
results show that our previously proposed method is effective in both cases in which the
network size is small or large. In addition, we conducted other simulation experiments to
measure several aspects of the assurance of our method. We measured in terms of varying
parameters such as node densities, distance between the source and the destination nodes,
and so on. Additionally, our method is more assured than the single path-based method.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [1,2] are an important direction for future networks. Disaster response, weather obser-
vation, crime prevention, and healthcare systems are examples of applications where WSNs are utilized. The size of WSNs
varies a great deal depending on the usage. WSNs consist of tiny nodes and sink nodes. Data on WSNs are transferred by
wireless links. When a node (a source node) cannot communicate with the sink node (the destination node), intermediate
nodes relay data from the source to the destination. This act of relaying data is referred to as multi-hop communication. Tiny
nodes are deployed on the object or in the ﬁeld to collect measurements. Because the nodes are small they have severely
limited memory size and computational power. They are deployed in a possibly hostile environment in which several kinds
of attacks may occur. Node capture attacks are one prospective kind of attack on WSNs [3]. To prevent such attacks, several
existing methods have been proposed. TinySec [4] is a security architecture used to ensure conﬁdentiality when transferring
data. TinySec uses a symmetric key such as RC4. While TinySec can protect data using key based cryptography, it is weak
against node capture attacks. When a node is captured, adversaries can get the key of the cryptosystem and all of the data
of the node. Since TinySec uses one common key for the system, adversaries can get all of the data in the network using
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the stolen key. To counter this, asymmetric key-based systems have been proposed. They are effective in limiting damage
against attacks. When a secret key is captured in symmetric key-based and asymmetric key-based systems, those systems
have to change the pair of keys. To do that, a random key pre-distribution scheme [5] and its successor [6,7] have been
proposed. Those systems need to send control packets to create keys. These results in a large delay before data can be
transmitted. That waiting time becomes long in large networks.
We have proposed a new method to protect data security against node capture attacks using distributed data transfer [8].
To use this method, we have to establish multiple paths. In the past we proposed a scalable method to create multiple paths
for distributed data transfer with a small number of control packets [9]. In that same paper, we implemented the proposed
method in the simulator by conducting simulation experiments on small and large networks and conﬁrmed the effectiveness
of the method on both. This proposed method was designed to hold up against changing environmental parameters such
as the node density, the number of source nodes, and the hop length between sources and the destination. In real systems,
the resiliency in light of those varying parameters will be important. Assurance or assurance networks express that resiliency.
According to [10], assurance in distributed systems and networks is deﬁned as the capability of guaranteeing functional and
non-functional system properties such as dependability, security, timeliness and adaptability to heterogeneous and changing
requirements. Networks which have the aforementioned assurance are deﬁned as assurance networks. Assurance network
technologies are important for New-generation networks, which Japan’s National Institute of Information and Communication
Technology plans to research. In the literature [11], Avižienis et al. proposed the concept of dependability. They claimed that
simultaneous consideration of dependability and security provides a very convenient means of subsuming various concerns
within a single conceptual framework. Assurance is one framework that looks into faults and security. In this paper, we
propose a method to evaluate both the security aspect of assurance, by focusing on conﬁdentiality, and the dependability
aspect, by focusing on resiliency against node faults.
The rest of the paper consists of the following: In Section 2, we introduce the dispersed data transfer method, which has
been proposed to hinder node capture attacks. In Section 3, we describe our new method. In Sections 4 and 5, we illustrate
our experiments and discuss the results. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. Secure decentralized data transfer against node capture attacks
In wireless sensor networks (WSNs), tiny sensor nodes are deployed on the object or to the ﬁeld to collect measurements.
A tiny sensor node has limited resources such as the available CPU power and the memory size.
In addition, the ﬁeld to be measured is a possibly hostile environment for WSNs in many cases. The tiny sensor nodes
are deployed and work autonomously for a certain period of time. It is not feasible for each sensor node to have detecting
capabilities to sense adversaries. To cope with security problems in WSNs, many countermeasures have been proposed.
Although many of them are key-based systems, the protection of the secret key(s) is a serious concern. When secret keys
are stolen by way of node capture attacks, encrypted data can be decrypted by adversaries. In the past, we have proposed
a method to secure decentralized data transfer against node capture attacks [12,8] (hereafter referred to as the previously
proposed method). Fig. 1 shows the data transfer of our previously proposed method. The previously proposed method can
encrypt data being transferred using the secret-sharing-scheme-based data dispersion [13,14,12]. In the literature [12], we
can conﬁrm the effectiveness of our previously proposed method using small size networks consisting of about nine nodes.
Assurance in these distributed systems and networks is deﬁned as the capability of guaranteeing functional and non-
functional system properties such as dependability, security, timeliness and adaptability to heterogeneous and changing
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Fig. 3. Example of network topology for proposed method.
Fig. 4. Example of routing table for ATR and proposed method.
Fig. 5. Example of routing table for DART.
requirements. To ensure the security in WSNs, it is important to consider what different scales of networks require. An ap-
proach to assurance in WSN security is to apply multipath routing required in our previously proposed method to the
currently proposed method.
3. Proposed method
In this section, we explain the routing method in our previously proposed method. The routing method, which was men-
tioned, also plays an important role in the current proposed method. In general, making multiple paths generates an excess
of control packets. To ﬁt our current method in with our previously proposed method, we have to suppress the escalation of
control packets. Caleﬃ et al. proposed ATR (Augmented Tree Based Routing) [15] as a tree-based multipath routing method.
ATR is an extension of DART (Dynamic Address Routing) [16]. Both DART and ATR have tree-based routing IDs. In addition,
assuming that a sub-tree includes a group of nodes, DART and ATR limit the amount of control packets and the size of the
routing table. However, ATR is used for re-routing the data packets where the routes break. Although Caleﬃ also explains
that ATR does not adapt to spatial diversity multipath routing in [15], our proposed method realizes spatial diversity. To re-
alize this spatial diversity in ATR, we use simultaneous transmission of shares, in which created by our previously proposed
method [12]. To create simultaneous multiple paths, we made an extension for ATR, in which the source nodes disperse the
original data to shares on the basis of the number of adjacent nodes of the source node. In addition, we extended ATR to
adapt to large WSNs using multiple clusters as in [17].
Figs. 2 and 3 are examples of a routing ID tree and a network topology. Additionally, Figs. 4 and 5 are examples of
routing tables of ATR/proposed method and DART.
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Fig. 7. Detouring process (occurrence of link break).
Since DART is a routing method for single-path routing, there is only one routing entry to reach a sub-tree. On the
other hand, ATR and our proposed method are multipath routing methods. Thus, they have one or more entries for the
same sub-tree. Although ATR re-routes packets in their original form, our method disperses the data along different routes
simultaneously. In addition, our routing method weakens the effect of node faults by detouring packets in transit. In our
proposed method, the data from source nodes is transferred according to the following:
• A source node refers to its routing table. It then transfers its shares to each routing entry. For example, if the source
node has a routing table such as in Fig. 4, the source node makes three (A, B, and C) shares. The number of shares
equals the number of routing entries in Fig. 4. Each share is created by our previously proposed method, i.e. the secret-
sharing-scheme-based method. As a result, each adjacent node has a different share.
• When a node detects failure of packet transmission due to link breakage, it detours the data packets. Before sending the
data packets, the node replicates the data to the buffers. Although we introduced single path-based data transmission
without packet detouring in [9], in this paper we introduce combination of multiple path-based data transmission and
packet detouring.
We explain the packet detouring procedure in detail using the network in Figs. 6, 7, and 8. Suppose node F tries to
send packets to node D. Figs. 6 to 8 illustrate situations. Each table in Figs. 6 to 8 indicates the routing tables of
Node F. In addition, the arrow illustrates the active entry of the routing table. The network in Figs. 6 to 8 shows data
ﬂow. Additionally, the arrow in the network illustrates the current ﬂow of data packets. Fig. 6 shows normal packet
transmission between nodes F and D. At this time, the route entry with the arrow is activated. When node F detects
link breakage, it de-activate the previous entry as in Fig. 7. Subsequently, node F seeks the routing entry with the same
sub-tree in its routing table. When a new routing entry is found, node F starts sending packets to the new next hop, E,
as in Fig. 8 and re-start sending packets to the new next hop node, E.
This detouring function and redundancy of shares which based on secret sharing scheme can handle node capture
attacks and node faults, simultaneously.
Thus, our proposed method realizes the simultaneous transmission of shares/data transfer.
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Table 1
Parameters of the simulation experiments.
Simulator QualNet ver. 4.5.1
Field size [m2] 2200× 2200, 2640× 2640
Number of nodes 401 (400 sensor nodes, 1 sink node)
Topology Grid with 100 or 120 [m] intervals
Number of source nodes 76 (on the fringe),
36 (5 hops apart from the sink node)
MAC layer protocol IEEE 802.11
Maximum bandwidth [Mbps] 2
Maximum radio area [m] 250
Simulation time [s] 1600
Data packet size [byte] 64
Frequency of transmission [packet/sec] 1
Check code algorithm for [12] CRC32 [19]
Fig. 9. The source (sensor) nodes are located the fringe of the network (labeled 76 in Figs. 8 and 9).
4. Simulation experiments
4.1. Fundamental characteristics
To conﬁrm the effectiveness of our proposed method in large networks, we conducted simulation experiments. We have
simulated our proposed method by using QualNet 4.5.1 [18]. Table 1 shows the parameters of the simulation experiments.
Additionally, we prepared the two network topologies with grid intervals of 100 and 120 [m] between nodes. These two
intervals were chosen in order to compare the difference at varying node densities. Fig. 9 shows the situation where the
source nodes are located on the fringe of the network. Fig. 10 shows the situation when the source nodes are located in the
middle between the sink (the center of the network) and the fringe. The source nodes are 5 hops apart from the sink node.
The number of source nodes is 76 and 36 in Figs. 9 and 10, respectively.
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(a) Number of source nodes affected when one node is captured. (b) Number of packets affected when one particular node is captured.
Fig. 11. Experimental results of the grid interval set at 100 m.
To conﬁrm the difference between single-path routing and multipath routing, we prepared DART for the former and
our proposed method for the latter. In the single-path routing simulation, the data from the source nodes were transferred
along the single path. Our simulation was performed as follows:
• The network begins to assign routing ID processes from the sink node once the simulation starts. In the simulations,
each sensor node sends the data individually one after another.
• 20 seconds from the start of the simulation, the ﬁrst sensor node begins to send data to the sink. This initial 20 second
interval is the time it takes to construct the network routes.
• 40 seconds after that at the one minute mark, the second node sends data to the sink node for 10 seconds. The
following 30 seconds is waiting time for the data to reach the sink node. This time is suﬃcient to transmit data from
the sensor node to the sink without resulting in congestion.
• Thereafter the other sensors begin to send data one after another every 40 seconds.
• Each sensor sends one packet every second for 10 seconds.
During the transmission of the source nodes, every sensor node (including the source nodes and the intermediate relay
nodes), records relayed data. After every transmission, we calculate to decrypt the data using relayed shares in each node.
Each node is assumed to be a captured node. To simulate the captured node, we use the decrypting algorithm as the sink
node.
Figs. 11 and 12 show the effects on the security of the networks. Figs. 11(a) and 12(a) show the number of source nodes
from which data can be decrypted when they are captured. Figs. 11(b) and 12(b) show the number of packets affected when
one certain node is captured. Each of the results in Figs. 11 and 12 is the average of 50 runs, and the smaller black error
bar shows the range of error at a 95% conﬁdence interval. Additionally, we investigate the path length. Fig. 13 illustrates
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Fig. 12. Experimental results of the grid interval set at 120 m.
(a) The grid interval is 100 m. (b) The grid interval is 120 m.
Fig. 13. Path length of simulations.
the average path hop length depending on the number of source nodes for each simulation. The results in Fig. 13 are the
average of 50 runs, and the smaller black error bar shows the range of error at a 95% conﬁdence interval.
4.2. Assurance of proposed method
4.2.1. Security and dependability
Again, assurance includes both security and dependability. In Section 1, we explore the idea of distributed data transfer
for security. In Section 3, we illustrate how distributed data transfer and packet detouring address dependability by guarding
against link breakage. This section outlines our experiments to measure the proposed method’s assurance.
We conducted a new batch of simulation experiments to measure the assurance of our proposed system. We have
simulated a single path-based method (Single path), our proposed method without detouring (Multiple paths without de-
touring), and our proposed method (Multiple paths with detouring) by using random topologies in which all nodes were
placed randomly. In the simulations, some nodes faulted together at the same time to simulate node faults. Table 2 shows
the simulation parameters. Other conditions are the same as in Section 4.1.
Figs. 14 and 15 show the results of our simulation experiments. Fig. 14 shows the results for the amount of original data
successfully captured with each method. Fig. 15 shows the results for the received data ratio on the sink node. With respect
to the amount of original data successfully captured, ‘Multiple paths without detouring’ and ‘Multiple paths with detouring’
are smaller than ‘Single path.’ Although with respect to the received data ratio, ‘Multiple paths without detouring’ is inferior
to ‘Single path’ while ‘Multiple paths without detouring’ is superior to ‘Single path.’ We clearly show from the results of
Figs. 14 and 15, our proposed method (‘Multiple paths with detouring’) has resiliency against both node capture attacks and
node faults.
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Parameters of the simulation experiments to measure assurance includes resiliency against node
capture attacks and against node faults.
Simulator QualNet ver. 4.5.1
Field size [m2] 2100× 2100
Number of nodes 401 (400 sensor nodes, 1 sink node)
Topology Random
Number of source nodes 10
MAC layer protocol IEEE 802.11 (PHY-ABSTRACT)
Maximum bandwidth [Mbps] 2
Maximum radio area [m] 250
Simulation time [s] 1600
Data packet size [byte] 64
Frequency of transmission [packet/sec] 1
Check code algorithm CRC32 [19]
Threshold for SSS (Number of adjacent nodes) – 3
Number of fault nodes 10, 20
Time of node faults occurred 30 [sec] from the start of the simulation
Number of trials 50
Fig. 14. Amount of original data successfully captured (security aspect of assurance).
Fig. 15. Received data ratio (dependability aspect of assurance).
4.2.2. Environmental change
Since our proposed system was found to be resilient against node capture attacks, we measured the assurance (which
includes security), of the system in this section. We did this by considering the amount of information that could be
acquired by adversaries.
We also conducted simulations differently from how we conducted them in Section 4.1. We have simulated our proposed
method by using the same topologies that were used in Section 4.1. Table 3 shows the simulation parameters in this section.
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Parameters of the simulation experiments to measure assurance.
Simulator QualNet ver. 4.5.1
Field size [m2] 2100× 2100, 2520× 2520,
2940× 2940, 3360× 3360,
3780× 3780, 4200× 4200
Number of nodes 401 (400 sensor nodes, 1 sink node)
Topology Grid with 100, 120, 140,
160, 180, 200 [m] intervals
Number of source nodes 76 (on the fringe), 68, 60,
52, 44, 36,
28, 20 (3 hops apart from the sink node)
MAC layer protocol IEEE 802.11 (PHY-ABSTRACT)
Maximum bandwidth [Mbps] 2
Maximum radio area [m] 250
Simulation time [s] 1600
Data packet size [byte] 64
Frequency of transmission [packet/sec] 1
Check code algorithm for [12] CRC32 [19]
Threshold for SSS (Number of adjacent nodes) – 1
Fig. 16. Total amount of decrypted data.
In this simulation, we investigated the effect that incrementally increasing the hop distance between the source and the
destination has on dependency. Fig. 16 shows the situation in which the ﬁrst nodes are located three hops from the sink.
Subsequent nodes are located one hop away in concentric squares to the fringe of the network. The number of source nodes
is 20, 28, 36, 44, 52, 60, 68, and 76, respectively. Each simulation is the result of 10 runs. The x-axis is the number of
source nodes. The y-axis is the total amount of data which can be decrypted from the nodes in the network and is equal
to the amount of information which adversaries can acquire. With our method, labeled on ‘Multiple paths’, the amount
of decrypted information is much smaller at all grid intervals from 100 m and 200 m, respectively, than ‘Single path’.
Additionally, there is an almost identical amount of decrypted data at both 180 [m] and 200 [m] grid intervals.
Fig. 17 shows the number of shares in our proposed method. The number of simulation runs, the error bar, and the
x-axis are the same as Fig. 16. The y-axis shows the number of shares. According to Fig. 17, when the grid interval is
100 m, a larger number of shares is generated. In addition, the number of shares decreases when the hops from the sink
increase. This is because when the node is nearer to the fringe, the number of adjacent nodes decreases. At grid intervals of
both 180 m and 200 m, the number of shares to disperse is almost identical. Grid intervals at 140 m and 160 m are almost
identical, too. While the total amount of decrypted data at grid intervals 180 m and 200 m is identical, the total amount of
decrypted data at grid intervals of 140 m and 160 m is not identical. It means that the former has less diversity of multiple
paths due to lower node density, but the latter has more diversity of multiple paths. Next, we conducted new simulation
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Fig. 18. Total amount of decrypted data (Grid interval 100 m, 2 Mbps).
Fig. 19. Total amount of decrypted data (Grid interval 120 m, 2 Mbps).
experiments in terms of the difference in the MAC layer protocol. The simulation parameters are the same as in Figs. 16
and 17 except for the MAC layer protocol. In these experiments, we employed MAC layer protocols based on IEEE802.11b at
2 Mbps and 11 Mbps.
Figs. 18 to 23 show the results of the simulations. The number of source nodes is 20, 28, 36, 44, 52, 60, 68, and 76.
Each simulation is the result of 10 runs, and the small black error bars on the data are the 95% conﬁdence interval. The
x-axis is the number of source nodes and the y-axis is the total amount of data which can be decrypted from the nodes
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Fig. 21. Total amount of decrypted data (Grid interval 100 m, 11 Mbps).
Fig. 22. Total amount of decrypted data (Grid interval 120 m, 11 Mbps).
in the network. According to the data decrypted in Fig. 18 through 23, our current proposed method has an advantage
over ‘Single path’ (DART). By comparing Figs. 18 and 21 the difference of the maximum bandwidth between 2 Mbps and
11 Mbps affects the improvement ratio of our proposed method.
5. Discussion
From the results in Figs. 11 and 12, our proposed method, which utilizes multiple paths, results in a smaller number of
nodes and packets being captured than the method that uses single paths. Also, the comparisons among Figs. 13(a) and 13(b)
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Table 4
Comparison of the probabilities of captured node data being compromised.
Single-path Multipath
Number of source node 76, 0.18 0.13
Grid with 100 m interval (0.72)
Number of source node 36, 0.09 0.06
Grid with 100 m interval (0.67)
Number of source node 76, 0.22 0.20
Grid with 120 m interval (0.91)
Number of source node 36, 0.11 0.06
Grid with 120 m interval (0.55)
Table 5
Comparison of the average number of streams compromised when one node is captured.
Single-path Multipath
Number of source node 76, 1.20 0.81
Grid with 100 m interval (0.68)
Number of source node 36, 0.33 0.22
Grid with 100 m interval (0.67)
Number of source node 76, 1.50 0.81
Grid with 120 m interval (0.54)
Number of source node 36, 0.68 0.29
Grid with 120 m interval (0.43)
show that multipath routing establishes slightly longer paths than single-path routing. This is because, the multiple paths
tend to be longer than the shortest hop path characteristic utilized of the single path method.
To discuss the differences in the results of Figs. 11 and 12, we normalized the results. We can get the probability that
node data will be compromised in Figs. 11(a) and 12(a). The results are shown in Table 4. Also, we calculate the aver-
age number of the streams that will be compromised when one node is captured using results in Figs. 11(b) and 12(b).
The results are shown in Table 5. The numbers in parentheses are the ratio of the single-path values to multipath val-
ues.
Table 5 shows that the average number of streams to be compromised when one node is captured is almost identical
regardless of the grid interval. In our simulations, the paths between the source and the destination (the sink node) are
concentrated around the sink node. As a result, the node captures that occur around the sink node have a signiﬁcant impact
on the security and reliability of the network. Conversely when the network has a dense ﬁeld of nodes around the sink
node [20], we can establish more diverse paths.
As we mentioned in Section 1, in order to create sustainable networks that stand up to attacks on security, measure-
ment of the degree of resilience on the systems is imperative. Generally, when we consider security problems with WSNs,
several categories exist. For example, attacks are categorized as denial of service (DoS) attacks, fabrication of the transfer
of data, impersonation/spooﬁng, and eavesdropping and so on. In those attacks, impersonation/spooﬁng and eavesdropping
are different from the others. Other attacks affect active data packets in the networks but impersonation and eavesdropping
are passive attacks. When we measure network assurance against active attacks, we do so by measuring the increasing
number of packets from adversaries. In contrast, when we measure the network assurance against passive attacks such as
eavesdropping, we have to consider the amount of information which might be acquired by adversaries.
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In this paper, we have proposed multipath routing as an extension of our previously proposed method of data dispersal.
To make multiple paths ﬁt our previously proposed method, we modiﬁed ATR. We have conducted simulation experiments
using our proposed method in a network simulator. The results show that our proposed method is effective in both cases
in which the network size is small and large. In addition, we conducted other simulation experiments to measure several
aspects of the assurance of our method. We measured in terms of varying parameters such as node densities, distance
between the source and the destination nodes, and so on. Additionally, our method is more assured than the single path-
based method.
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